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This article reviews developments in mergers and acquisitions ("M&As") and joint ven-
tures ("JVs") during the year 2014.
I. Brazil
Among the many functions of the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission
("CVM"), is the promotion of capital market expansion in Brazil. CVM has been imple-
menting new rules to further stimulate securities public offerings in Brazil since 2009.
The first major step was the implementation of CVM Instruction No. 4761 ("iCVM
476"), which aimed to reduce the costs of public offerings, facilitating new issuers in rais-
ing funds through the issuance of certain securities, including debentures (the Brazilian
equivalent of bonds), that are exempted from registration. CVMVI has limited the scope of
offerings exempted under iCVM 476 to investors with the ability and knowledge to evalu-
ate these investments and who have the capacity to bear losses of part or all of their invest-
ments. These investors are refered to as qualified investors.
The registration exemption accelerated the offering process, reducing the timeframe
between the decision of the issuer to raise ftnds and the debt issuance, thus increasing the
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1. Instrugao CVM No. 476, de 16 de Janeiro de 2009, D.O.U. de 19.01.2009 (Braz.).
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profitability rate of the security. More companies now have access to this sort of funding.
Many of them end up making their first steps on the capital market. After the implemen-
tation of iCVM 476, there was a "boom" of debentures issuances. From a little more than
a few dozen of debentures issuances in 2008, Brazil now has hundreds of issuances per
year.
The debt market has been growing since the implementation of iCVM 476. The equity
market wished for a similar regulatory modification, which would enable it to experience
the same growth. These modifications were implemented with CVM Instruction No.
551/20142 ("iCVM 551 ), which expanded the number of securities which can be offered
under the scope of iCVM 476, including shares and convertible or exchangeable deben-
tures, subscription warrants,3 certificates of deposit of shares, and certificates of structured
transactions.
To obtain a registration exemption, the offering needs to follow a series of require-
ments, applicable to all securities regulated by iCVM 476. For example, the limitation of
the offering to qualified investors and the number of qualified investors that can partici-
pate. However, CVM decided to increase the maximum number of qualified investors
who can participate in restricted offerings under iCVM 476 from twenty to fifty, and to
increase the number of investors who can be consulted during the process from fifty to
seventy five. Furthermore, CVM decided to exempt the ninety days restriction to trade
(lock-up) that applies to securities offered under iCVM 476, if such offering concerns
shares, subscription bonuses, and certificates of deposit.
Companies that already have their shares publicly traded and have plans to make a
subsequent offer ("follow-on") will benefit the most from this greater flexibility in offer-
ings. As a simple comparison, the initial review period for CVM in relation to an offering
to a wider public (under CVM Instruction No. 4004) is twenty days, but the registration of
the offering may take more or less time depending on how quickly the company is able to
comply with the demands of CVM. In case of the distribution of shares under iCVM 476,
the time involved with an offering may be limited to the time that the existing sharehold-
ers of a company would have to exercise their right of first refusal, (i.e. five business days).
With the implementation of iCVM 551, the risk of exposure of the issuers to the volatility
of the shares dramatically lowers. CVM showed it has heard the wishes of the market.
The door to more investments is open.
II. Canada
The Canadian Securities Administrators (the "CSA"), recently updated the status of
proposals to regulate take-over bids in a harmonized fashion across Canada (the "Pro-
2. Instrugao CVM No. 551, de 25 de Setembro de 2014, D.O.U. de 26.09.2014 (Braz.).
3. Shares, debentures convertible into shares, shares that are the object of exchangeable debentures and
warrants should be issued by a issuer registered as a public company of the "A" category as defined by Instru-
gao CVM No. 480, de 25 de Dezembrode 2009, D.O.U. de 09.12.2009 (Braz.).
4. Instrugao CVM No. 400, de 29 de Dezembro de 2003, D.O.U. de 09.01.2004 (Braz.).
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posed Amendments")5 that will also affect the treatment of shareholder rights plans (i.e.
"poison pills").
In contrast to Delaware practice, Canadian shareholder rights plans have traditionally
been strictly limited to the single purpose of helping a board of directors "buy time" to
seek out improved or alternative offers (i.e., a "white knight")6 Once that purpose has
been served, Canadian securities commissions would routinely issue a "cease trade" order
in respect of a pill, thereby sending whatever offer was on the table to a shareholder vote.
It was widely accepted that, under such conditions, a "just say no" defense was generally
unavailable in Canada.7
This position was consistent with the minimal guidance available under Canadian se-
curities laws regarding defensive tactics8 and was demonstrated in an influential Ontario
Securities Commission decision over two decades ago that stated: "The time had come for
the pill to go." 9 As a result, a generation of market participants has acted on the under-
standing that Canadian securities regulators will generally terminate pills within some
fixed period after the commencement of a hostile bid. This approach has conditioned
board responses to hostile bids and, in the global mergers and acquisition context, has
made Canadian issuers attractive targets, setting aside the existence of a shareholder rights
plan.
Notwithstanding the above, under Canada's fragmented securities regulatory regime,
various jurisdictions have issued contradictory decisions, in which the Delaware-style bus-
iness judgment rule was seemingly adopted and the relevant question became whether
(and not when) a pill should be terminated.' 0 This question of timing has recently come
to the forefront as a result of the British Columbia Securities Commission's (the "BCSC")
recent decision regarding Augusta Resource Corporation's shareholder rights plan during
HudBay Minerals Inc.'s proposed hostile takeover bid of Augusta. In Augusta, the BCSC
allowed the pill to survive for an unprecedented 156 days." The BCSC weighed several
factors, including: (a) the length of time the bid was outstanding; (b) the likelihood that a
superior proposal could ultimately be found; and (c) whether the bid was coercive (the
BCSC determined that all three factors supported HudBay's bid)' 2 However, a fourth key
factor-the approval of the rights plan by 94 percent of the votes cast by Augusta share-
holders (excluding the votes of HudBay),1 3 combined with the likelihood that HudBay
would extend its bid-was sufficient for the BCSC to allow the pill to survive for such an
extended period.
5. See CSA Notice 62-306-Update on Proposed National Instrument 62-105 Security Holder Rights
Plans and AMF Consultation Paper An Alternative Approach to Securities Regulators' Intervention in Defen-
sive Tactics (2014), 37 O.S.C. Bull. 8229 (Can.).
6. PHILLIP MARTINIUs, M&A: PROTECTING THE PURCHASER, 155, (2005).
7. See In the Matter of Baffinland Iron Mines Corporation et al. (2010), 33 O.S.C. Bull. 11385 (Can.).
8. See National Policy 62-202-Take-Over Bids-Defensive Tactics (1997), 20 O.S.C. Bull. 3525 (Can.).
9. See Re Canadian Jorex Limited and Mannville Oil & Gas Ltd. (1992), 15 O.S.C. Bull. 257 (Can.).
10. See, e.g. Neo Material Technologies inc., (Re) (2009), available at https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/docu-
ments/en/Proceedings-RAD/rad 20090901_neo-material.pdf.; Pulse Data Inc., (Re) (2007), 2007 A.S.C.
Bull. (Can. Alta. Sec. Corn.). .
11. HudBay Minerals Inc. and Augusta Resource Corporation. (2014), 2014 BSECCOM 154 ¶79 (Can.
B.C. Sec. Corn.).
12. Id. at ¶¶46, 51, 59.
13. Id. at T 21.
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The Proposed Amendments, once adopted, should buttress the traditional Canadian
position-that a pill has a definitive shelf-life notwithstanding the target board's judgment
or machinations. Furthermore, the Proposed Amendments, in an effort to harmonize and
codify the takeover bid rules in Canada as they relate to hostile bids and shareholder rights
plans, would require all formal bids for Canadian public targets to, among other things,
include a minimum bid period of 120 days.' 4
With the stated objective of rebalancing the current dynamics between hostile bidders
and target boards, the Proposed Amendments aim to make it easier for shareholders to
make voluntary, informed, and coordinated tender decisions, while giving target boards
more time to respond to hostile bids.
Presumably, as the Proposed Amendments will remove some of the coercive features of
the current regime, target boards can likely expect to have a more difficult time defending
a poison pill that goes beyond the protections of the Proposed Amendments. However,
depending on how the Proposed Amendments are implemented, the CSA may leave open
the possibility for regulatory intervention in appropriate circumstances, which could con-
tinue to conflict on a case-by-case and jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction basis.
III. Chile
A number of relevant legal developments have taken place in the Corporate and M&A
field in Chile in 2014. The most important is Law 20,720's on Reorganization and Liqui-
dation, which came into force on October 10, 2014, replacing the previous bankruptcy
regime with a new reorganization and liquidation system.
This law provides a new paradigm in the Chilean bankruptcy field, moving from a sys-
tem focused on asset liquidation to a system aimed at pursuing a balance between liquida-
tion and reorganization. This new system also seeks to maximize the asset value, preserve
the insolvency estate to allow for a fair distribution among the creditors, and promote a
fast and efficient termination of the insolvency process.
Under Law 20,720, the protection given to the debtor has been significantly strength-
ened. For example, upon filing the reorganization form, the competent court will grant
financial bankruptcy protection to the debtor for a period of 30 to 90 days (depending on
the creditors' support).1 6 During this period, all contracts to which the debtor is a party
remain in force, and their payment terms and conditions cannot be modified.
Furthermore, the body of creditors may now challenge contracts that the company en-
tered into before the reorganization or liquidation. The challenges happen through revo-
catory actions if the relevant contract caused damages to the body of creditors and the
party executing the contract had actual knowledge of the bad economic condition of the
company.
Another element of Law 20,720 that will likely improve the process of reorganization,
liquidation, and bankruptcy is that insolvency proceedings will be subject to the jurisdic-
tion of specialized courts rather than ordinary civil courts.
14. See CSA Notice 62-306, supra note 5.
15. See Law No. 20720, Diciembre 30, 2013, DI Ro OFicIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
16. Id.
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In an effort to simplify the Chilean corporate regulations, Law 20,71217 on Funds and
Portfolio Management (also known as "Single Funds Act?) entered into force on May 1,
2014. This law consolidates the regulations applicable to private equity and venture capital
investment funds in one single bill. Its main purpose is to unify and simplify the legal
bodies governing the management of funds in a common and orderly legal framework and
to incorporate certain basic regulations on management of individual portfolios. The old
regulations that governed mutual funds, investment funds, foreign capital investment
funds, and real estate funds were repealed.
The Single Funds Act distinguishes between three types of funds: (i) mutual funds,
which allow full and permanent recovery of shares with the redemption payment being
made within 10 days; (ii) public investment funds, which are those funds that are not
mutual funds, and that can be divided into funds that do not allow redemption and funds
that permit it with the redemption payment being made in 180 days or more; and (iii)
private investment funds, which are investment funds with fewer than fifty investors.18
While public mutual funds and investment funds are subject to the supervision of the
Securities and Insurance Authority, private investment funds are not.
Finally, the scope of Law 20,65919 (also known as the "One-Day Companies Act?),
which simplifies the incorporation, amendment and dissolution of Chilean companies, has
continued to expand, as it is now applicable not only to limited liability companies
(sociedades de responsabilidad limitada), but also to single-owner limited liability enterprises
(empresas individuales de responsabilidad limitada) and, most interestingly, to companies lim-
ited by shares (sociedades por acciones).
Pursuant to the One-Day Companies Act, a special electronic platform was created on
which the Enterprises and Companies Register administers the registrations of companies
under the supervision of the Ministry of Economy, Development and Tourism. Compa-
nies can be registered by uploading a form available for any person on the website, while
the taxpayer number and an authorization to start business activities are simultaneously
granted by the Tax Authority.
The One-Day Companies Act should become applicable to all types of companies in
the next couple of years, except for listed stock corporations.
IV. China
Chinese legislators adopted important regulations in 2013 and 2014. A primary policy
drive is to streamline burdensome regulatory approval requirements and administration
practices, in the context of a slower export-based economic growth in China.
17. See Law No. 20712, Diciembre 24, 2013, DIARIo OFicIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
18. Id.
19. See Law No. 20659, Enero 31, 2013, DiAmo OFicIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
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A. CONTINUED LIFTING OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT MARKET ENTRY RESTRICTIONS
Following the launch of the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone in September
2013, the Chinese government updated the Negative Approval List in June 2014.20 With
the exception of 139 specific industries listed in the Negative Approval List, foreign direct
investments are exempt from foreign investment approval, which would require a filing
with the authorities.2 1
In November 2014, the National Development and Reform Commission released the
revised draft of the Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment (the "Cata-
logue") for consultation with the public.22 The revised Catalogue will likely come into
effect by the end of 2014. Pursuant to the draft, many industries are to be removed from
the "Restricted Category," such as online distribution, development of land, trust compa-
nies, insurance brokerage companies, real estate brokerage and the operation of high-class
hotels, office buildings, and movie theaters. Pursuant to the revised Catalogue in certain
industries, such as the development of new technologies for oil exploration and exploita-
tion and the design and manufacture of airborne equipment for civil aviation, foreign
investors may set up wholly-owned subsidiaries to structure their investment. In other
industries, such as the maintenance of railway infrastructures and international marine
transportation services, foreign investors may set up a joint venture company, with the
foreign investor owning the majority interest.
B. REVISIONS TO THE COMPANY LAW AND CHANGE OF COMPANY REGISTRATION
RULES
The equity capital contribution rules were extensively liberalised by revisions to the
Company Law adopted at end of 2013 and certain follow-on regulations of the State
Council.23 The main changes include the transition of the registered capital payment
system from a mandatory full amount contribution to a voluntary subscription, the re-
moval of requirements of minimum equity capital, the removal of the time limit of the
actual payment of the registered capital, and the removal of the minimum percentage of
cash contribution. 24 However, such changes do not apply to a list of twenty seven indus-
tries, including insurance companies, banks, securities houses, and trust companies. 25 The
20. Special Management Measures for the Market Entry of Foreign Investment in the China (Shanghai)
Pilot Free Trade Zone (Negative List) (2014 Revision), (promulgated by the Standing Comm. People's Cong.
Shanghai Municipality, June 30, 2014, effective Oct. 1, 2014) (Westlaw China).
2 1. Id.
22. National Development and Reform Commission on the "Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment
Industries" revised public comment, NAT'L DEv. & REFORM COMM'N, http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwzx/xwfb/
201411/t20141104_647350.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2014).
23. The Registered Capital of the State Council on the Issuance of a Registration System Reform Program
Notice, Guo Fa [2014] on the 7th, available at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2014-02/18/content_2611545.htm;
George Qi & Dawn Zhang, China Publishes Administrative Provisions on the Registration of the Registered
Capital of Companies, NAT'L L. REv. (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/china-pub-
lishes-administrative-provisions-registrationregistered-capital-companies.
24. Company Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 23, 2013, effective
Mar. 1, 2014), arts. 23, 26, 27, 29, 80; Reform Plan, supra note 22, art. 2 (1).
25. Reform Plan, supra note 22, Appendix.
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changes apply to enterprises in China that have foreign investments. However, the total
investment in a company by a foreign investor is still subject to limitations.26
C. CHINESE OUTBOUND INVESTMENT-LIFTING OF GOVERNMENTAL APPROVAL
REQUIREMENTS
Both the National Development and Reform Commission ("NDRC") and the Ministry
of Commerce ("MOFCOM") issued new regulations that substantially delegated approval
powers for Chinese outbound investment projects ("OIPs") to lower-level authorities.
Only OIPs in "sensitive countries or regions" or "sensitive industries" are to be approved
by NDRC and MOFCOM.27 Furthermore, OIPs with a proposed Chinese investment




In 2012, an innovative tax reform was approved in Colombia by means of Law 160729
The tax reform became effective in 2013 and has significantly modified the landscape of
transactions in Colombia. Likewise, after the reelection of President Juan Manuel Santos,
the government is planning an additional tax reform, aiming to raise over US$26.5 billion
in the next four years. With this reform, the government seeks not only the creation and
expansion of several taxes in Colombia, but also the implementation of an adequate mech-
anism to fight tax evasion.
The draft tax reform is mostly focused on high net worth individuals.30 As many Co-
lombian companies are family owned, this reform may have an impact on M&A activity as
such companies will likely reorganize assets in Colombia in order to mitigate the effects of
the tax reform.
B. PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL INCREASING INVESTMENT IN
COLOMBIA
Large high profile transactions were common in Colombia during 2014, but in particu-
lar private equity and venture capital transactions significantly increased in volume. Pri-
vate equity transactions increased in volume due to the changes in the economic
environment and the broadening of private equity platforms. The latest Latin American
26. See Jiamiu Sun, MOFCOM to Confirm Relaxation ofRegistered Capital Contribution Requirements for FIEs,
CHINA LAW UPDATE BLOG (July 8, 2014), http://www.chinalawupdate.cn/2014/07/articles/foreign-direct-
investment/mofcom-to-confirm-relaxation-of-registered-capital-contribution-requirements-for-fies/.
27. See Laney Zhang, China: Rules Revised to Facilitate Overseas Investments, LIBR CONGRESS (Oct. 31, 2014),
http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/llocnews?disp3_1205404181_text.
28. Id.
29. L. 1607, diciembre 26, 2012, DiARIo OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
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Private Equity & Venture Capital Association ("LAVCA") reports highlighted Colombia's
efforts to promote its regulation and improve its status on the scorecard.3 1 Moreover,
Colombian Association of Private Equity Funds ("ColCapital") has been very active dur-
ing 2014, evaluating the increasing investments and exits of private equity funds in Co-
lombia.32 At a more general level, private equity in the Latin-American region is expected
to further increase its investment during 2015.33 Although the venture capital industry
has been slowly growing during the past years, during 2014 it captured an important por-
tion of the M&A market in Colombia. With the consolidation of government sponsored
entities such as Innpulsa, Corporaci6n Ventures and Bancoldex, the Colombian govern-
ment has attracted more investors interested in startups. Additionally, the number of an-
gel investors has increased during the past years. Recently, local angel networks such as
the Bavaria Foundation, the Bolfvar-Davivienda Foundation, and Capitalia have been very
successful in attracting more investment to the industry.
C. HIGHLIGHTED TRANSACTIONS
Although 2014 has not been an outstanding year in M&A activity, some of the most
important deals in the history of Colombia came through. The most relevant event of the
year was the closing of the merger between Millicom Spain Cable S.L. and state-owned
fixed services provider UNE EPM Telecomunicaciones S.A. The US$4.4 billion purchase
price was one of the most relevant characteristics of the transaction. The deal required
multiple and rigorous approvals and included a bond offering for an aggregate amount of
US$800 million.34
In the financial industry, Banco Itai acquired a controlling stake in Corpbanca. The
deal included a merger of the Colombian and Chilean subsidiaries of Corpbanca and an
injection of US$652 million in the resulting entity. The overall transaction had an ap-
proximate value of US$2.2 billion and is subject to regulatory approvals. With this deal,
Banco Itaui will enter the retail banking industry, resulting in a breakthrough transaction
for the Colombian banking industry.
VI. Germany
"Paper is patient"-a common saying in Germany. Even if something is put on paper, it
certainly does not mean that it is already effective. This is presumably what Chancellor
Merkel's right-of-center CDU party had in mind when it publicly supported a statutory
quota for women on the supervisory boards of Germany's largest corporations. This pro-
vision was part of the coalition agreement entered into by the CDU and the left-of-center
31. See 2014 Scorecard Update, LAVCA (May 29, 2014), http://lavca.org/2014/05/29/2013-lavca-scorecard-
2014-update/.
32. See Janette Recarte, "La industria de private equity en Colombia vive un momento clave", FUNDS PEOPLE
(May 29, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.fundspeople.com/noticias/la-industria-de-private-equity-en-colombia-
vive-un-momento-clave.
33. See Thomas Muskett-Ford, LatAm private equity to deploy funds and diversiy in 2015, LATIN LAWYER
(Sept. 15, 2014), http://latinlawyer.com/news/article/47234/latam-private-equity-deploy-funds-diversify-
2015/.
34. See Lulu Rumsey, Millicom Moves to Medellin, LATIN LAWYER (Oct. 17, 2014), http://latinlawyer.com/
news/article/47375/millicom-moves-medellin/.
VOL. 49
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
AN ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
M&A AND JOINT VENTURES 69
SPD party on November 27, 2013 (the "Coalition Agreement")." Specifically, the Coali-
tion Agreement sets forth that the CDU/SPD coalition government will enact legislation
requiring Germany's largest corporations to have supervisory boards that consist of at
least thirty percent women. 36 German statutory law provides for a two-tier board: large
German corporations must have both an executive board and a supervisory board. A su-
pervisory board, as the name would indicate, monitors and advises the executive board.
In July 2001, the German government issued the "Agreement Between the Federal
Government and the Primary Trade Associations of German Business to Promote Equal
Treatment for Women and Men in the Private Company."3 7 The purpose of this agree-
ment, which in itself was a political compromise as there was not enough political support
for a statute promoting gender diversity at the workplace, was to establish concrete goals
for equal treatment of women in the workplace, including instituting flex time and
telecommuting and promoting mentoring in the workplace for women. Not much has
happened since then as women currently hold slightly less than six percent of the execu-
tive board positions and approximately only nineteen percent of the supervisory board
positions in Germany.38 Nor has much happened since November 27, 2013, in terms of
introducing specific legislation to promote women on corporate boards-until now.
Manuela Schwesig, Germany's Minister of Families, Senior Citizens, Women and
Youth, and Heiko Maas, the Minister of Justice, both cabinet members and SPD party
members, presented a joint draft statute earlier this year. Under the proposal, thirty per-
cent of supervisory board positions of companies that are publicly listed and that have
more than 2,000 employees (just over 100 companies) are to be held by women. 39 Compa-
nies that satisfy only one of these thresholds (approximately 3,500 companies) would be
subject to less stringent thresholds, but would also be required to increase the number of
female supervisory board members and executive board members. 40
Despite the clear wording of last year's Coalition Agreement, a number of influential
CDU cabinet members have raised concerns about the draft statute stating that it would
not pass constitutional muster. One not very politically savvy politician noted that it
would be in Germany's best interest to delay the implementation of the statute because of
Europe's current weak economy (apparently meaning that adding women as executive and
supervisory board members would be an unnecessary risk to an already fragile economy).
Other European countries have introduced legislation setting forth quotas for women at
the board level, most notably Norway, France, Spain, Iceland, Belgium, the Netherlands,
35. Deutschlands Zukunft Gestalten [Shaping Germany's Future], Nov. 27, 2013, available at https://www
.cdu.de/sites/default/files/media/dokumente/koalitionsvertrag.pdf
36. Id.
37. Vereinbarung zwischen der Bundesregierung und den Spitzenverbanden der deutschen Wirtschaft zur
Forderung der Chancengleichheit von Frauen und Mainnern in der Privatwirtschaft [Agreement Between the
Federal Government and the Primary Trade Associations of German Business to Promote Equal Treatment
for Women and Men in the Private Company], July 2,2001, available atwww.dihk.de/ressourcen/downloads/
chancengleichheit.pdf.
38. Id.
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and Italy. The European Parliament proposed a draft directive in 201241 calling for pub-
licly held companies to have at least forty percent female non-executive directors by Janu-
ary 2018.42 At this point, it is doubtful that the European Parliament's proposal will be
implemented. In Germany, however, Chancellor Merkel's government will approve the
women's quota for Germany on December 11, 2014.43 As of January 1, 2016, Germany
will require publicly listed companies, as well as companies with more than 2,000 employ-
ees, to have their supervisory boards comprise of at least thirty percent women.44 Surpris-
ingly, this requirement will also apply to European companies (Societas Europaea) with
German headquarters (currently seven companies). Companies will have three years as of
2016 to satisfy this statutory requirement.
VII. India
The year 2014 witnessed certain Indian competition law developments that are notable
for their implications on international mergers & acquisitions (M&A). The Indian Com-
petition Act, 200241 (Competition Act) regulates both domestic and international M&A
that have bearing on the Indian market. In case of international M&A having local nexus,
the parties are required to notify the Competition Commission of India (CCI) about the
nexus within thirty days of board approval or of executing an agreement. 46 Under the
Competition Act, the term "Combinations" includes M&A, taking place within or outside
the territory of India. Even for overseas Combinations, the Competition Act has pre-
scribed "Threshold" limits.47 The parties must notify CCI of any Combination that
meets the threshold. As per its "Exempted Threshold Notification48 ," CCI has exempted
companies from notification until March 2016 if the target company in India has assets
less than INR 2.50 billion and turnover less than INR 7.50 billion. But, when an Indian
target company crosses the "Exempted Threshold," then the overall deal is subjected to
the "Test of Threshold." If that is also met, then notification to CCI becomes mandatory.
The procedural aspects of notification have been provided under CCI Combination Regu-
lations, 2011.49 The parties can notify CCI in various prescribed forms. Once the notifi-
41. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of The Council on Improving the Gender Balance
Among Non-Executive Directors of Companies Listed on Stock Exchanges and Related Measures (Nov. 14, 2012),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/womenonboards/directive-quotas-en.pdf
42. Press Release, European Commission justice, Women on Boards: Commission proposes 40% objective
(Nov. 14, 2012) available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/gender-equality/news/121114_en.htm.
43. Gleichberechtigung: Koalition einigt sich auf Frauenquote in Aufsichtsriten [Equal Rights: Coalition




45. Competition Act, 2002, No. 12 of 2003, INDIA CODE (2007) as amended by the Competition (Amend-
ment) Act, No. 39 of 2007 INDIA CODE (2007).
46. Id. at § 6.
47. Id. at § 5.
48. Lex Mundi Publication, PRE-MERGER NOTIFICATION GUIDE, INDIA 1 (2012), available at www
.lexmundi.com/Document.asp?DoclD=961.
49. CCI Procedure in regard to the transaction of business relating to combinations Regulations, (May 11,
2009), available at http://cci.gov.in/May201 1/Home/regulation/Combination% 2oRegulations% 2Oas%2Oat%
2028-3-14%20(2).pdf~phpMyAdmin=NMPFRahGKYeum5F74Ppstn7RfOO.
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cation is received by CCI, CCI will express its prima facie view within thirty days, and
within 210 days either rejects the deal or clears the deal with or without modifications.s0
A. AMENDMENT COMBINATION REGULATIONS, 20141
On March 28, 2014, the Combination Regulations were amended and a new Regulation
9(5) was added empowering CCI to look into the substance of the deal by looking through
the structures. This effectively means that CCI can make the companies notify even if
they are not crossing the "Threshold." Regulation 9(4) requires a "Consolidated Notifi-
cation" if a business transaction involves series of interdependent steps where one or two
can be classified as Combination. This could be the reason for the amendment. It eases
the compliance on the part of the companies as they are not required to notify at each
step. It is still to be understood and clarified what would be considered as "substance of
the transaction." In absence of any clarification from CCI, companies should consider
applying both the tests of "Threshold" and "Substance" while structuring any M&A deal.
It is important to look at the transaction in a holistic way rather than in parts.
B. M&A DEAL OF SUN PHARMACEUTICALS INDUSTRIES LIMITED (SUN PHARMA) AND
RANBAXY LABORATORIES LIMITED (RANBAXY)5 2
Sun Pharma and Ranbaxy notified CCI of their Combination proposal on May 6, 2014.
CCI started its investigation and framed its prima facie view that this Combination will
have an appreciable "adverse effect.5 " This is the first time CCI has invoked the second
level investigation in any Combination. It has asked parties to publish details of the Com-
bination and has sought public comments. Based on the comments, CCI may ask parties
for further information. After receiving further clarifications, CCI may reject the deal,
pass it, or pass it with certain modifications. In this case, CCI made combined market
shares of the companies in various categories of drugs the basis of its prima facie view.
Clearly the parties need to consider the factors of nature of business and combined market
shares while structuring a deal, as these may be decisive in determining the timeframe and
outcome of CCI's imperative approval process.
VIII. Netherlands
The issue of directors having sufficient time to properly fulfill their duties is increas-
ingly becoming the subject matter of legislation, which imposes restrictions on the pos-
sibilities of board position appointment or reappointment. This year the rules that
applied to listed companies and so-called "large companies" have been extended by similar
new regulations for pension funds and "significant" banks and investment institutions.
50. Id.
51. See The Competition Commission of India (Procedure in regard to the transaction of business relating
to combinations) Amendment Regulations, 2014 (March 28, 2014), available at http://cci.gov.in/May2011/
Home/regulation/march%202014.pdf.
52. Press Release, Form IV Contained in Schedule II to the Combination Regulations Under Sec 29(2) of
Competition Act, 2002 (as amended) (Sept. 4, 2014), available at http://www.sunpharma.com/press-releases.
53. Id. at § 20(4).
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The Dutch Corporate Governance Code (the "Code?) was the first regulation limit-
ing the number of board positions that managing and supervisory directors can hold
within Dutch-listed companies." The Code applies on a "comply or explain" basis. But,
due to the mandatory nature of the Dutch Civil Code (the "Civil Code"), Dutch-listed
companies that also qualify as a "large company" within the meaning of the Civil Code56
can no longer deviate from the Code on this point. Pursuant to the Code, managing
directors of Dutchlisted companies cannot hold more than two supervisory positions nor
can they act as chairman of a supervisory board.57 The maximum number of supervisory
boards of Dutchlisted companies that an individual may be a member of is limited to five.
But, for these purposes, the chairmanship of a supervisory board counts as double.58 The
provisions in the Code with respect to supervisory directors also apply to non-executive
directors in a one-tier board. 59 The Code does not limit the number of managing or
executive board positions.
The Civil Code limits the number of board positions that directors can hold within
"large" companies. 60 The question whether the nominee is eligible for a position has to
be assessed at the time of appointment or re-appointment. 61 The limitations set out in the
Civil Code are the same as the limitations of the Code. But, contrary to the Code, an
appointment in violation of the Civil Code is void, although it does not invalidate the
decision-making in which the director concerned participated. If the nominee holds a
position with a pension fund or "significant" bank or investment company, it is necessary
to establish that the specific regulations for these sectors do not result in any additional
complications.
On July 1, 2014, a limitation regulation was adopted that specifically applies to pension
funds (the "pension funds regulation"). 62 A pension fund cannot proceed with an appoint-
ment if the managing or supervisory director would hold more than one full-time
equivalent ("FTE") in managing and supervisory board positions.63 The regulation in-
cludes a weighing factor to determine the time involved with the position concerned. 64 As
of August 1, 2014, the Financial Supervision Act includes a limitation regulation that spe-
cifically applies to banks and investment institutions that qualify as "significant" (the
54. Dutch Corporate Governance Code, Jan. 1, 2009, available at http://commissiecorporategovernance.nl/
dutch-corporate-governance-code.
55. Id.
56. See art. 2:153 BW (Neth.); see also art. 2.263 BW (Neth.).
57. Dutch Corporate Governance Code, supra 54, at Best Practice Provision 11.1.8.
58. Id. at 111.3.4
59. Press release, The Monitoring Committee (Neth.) (Sept. 26, 2012), available at http://www.corpgov.nl/
nieuws/1986/Code-en-non-executive-directors.
60. See art. 2:132a BW (Neth.); see also art. 2:142a BW (Neth.); see also art. 2:242a BW (Neth.); see also art.
252a (Neth.).
61. Id.
62. Wet versterking bestuur pensioenfondsen [Pension Fund Governance Act] July 1, 2014 (Neth.), availa-
ble at https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2013-302.html.
63. See Pensioenwet [Pension Act] art. 106a (Neth.); see also Besluit uitvoering pensioenwet [Implementa-
tion Decree Pension Act] art. 35a (Neth.).
64. See Pensioenwet [Pension Act] art. 106a (Neth.); see also Besluit uitvoering pensioenwet [Implementa-
tion Decree Pension Act] art. 35a (Neth.).
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"CRD IV regulation"). 65 The European Union (EU) directive implemented by the CRD
IV regulation does not provide a specific interpretation of "significant," but describes that
individual circumstances and the nature, scale, and complexity of the institution's activities
need to be examined. 66 Directors of "significant" banks or investment institutions may
not hold more than one management board position and two supervisory positions, or
four supervisory positions at the same time, including the position with the significant
bank or investment institution.67 As the CRD IV regulation is based on an EU directive,
positions outside the Netherlands also presumably count. Directors within these institu-
tions are continuously required to observe these limitations, regardless of whether their
appointment or re-appointment is at stake. An appointment in violation of these limita-
tions is not void, but the authorities can commence an enforcement procedure.
IX. Spain
Over the last few years, the EU has considered lack of strict and mandatory corporate
governance regulations as an indirect and underlying cause of the financial crisis that its
economy has been and is currently suffering. As a result, the legislative powers in Spain
have passed several regulations seeking to control or limit excessive and imprudent risk-
taking. In addition, these regulations strive to standardize the implementation of trans-
parent and reasonable remuneration systems for directors and top executives and the
professionalization of the governing bodies of financial entities and private companies.
On May 30, 2014, the Spanish parliament passed the Draft Companies Act Amendment
regarding improvements on corporate governance 68 (the "Bill"), which intends to imple-
ment amendments or include new articles regarding matters related to corporate govern-
ance. Especially relevant is the amendment related to accumulation in the same person of
the positions of chairman of the board of directors and chief executive officer of compa-
nies listed on the stock exchange in Spain. If the Bill is finally approved, most of these
companies will have to amend their current bylaws and internal structure.
The separation of the positions of chairman of the board of directors and chief execu-
tive officer of a company are organized so that these positions are held by two different
people, which has always been included in the expert reports on corporate governance
regarding listed companies. Particularly, in Spain, this matter has been addressed in Sec-
65. Implementatiewet richtlijn en verordening kapitaalvereisten [Implementation Act Directive and Regu-
lation Capital Requirements (CRD IV)] Aug. 1, 2014 (Neth.), available at https://zoek.officielebekendmaking
en.nl/stb-2014-253.html.
66. Directive on Capital Requirements 2013/36/EU PbEU (L 176) (EU), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/egal-content/EN/TXT/?uriLEX:32013LOO36.
67. See Wet op het financieel toezicht [Financial Supervision Act] art. 3:8 (3), (4) and art. 4:9b (Neth.); see
also Besluit prudentiele regels Wft [Decree on Prudential Rules Financial Supervision Act] art. 17d (Neth.);
see also Besluit gedragstoezicht financiele ondernemingen Wft [Decree on Market Conduct Supervision Fi-
nancial Institutions] art. 30b (Neth.).
68. Spanish Companies Act Amendment Bill B.O.E. 2014, No. 121/000097, available at http://www.con-
greso.es/publicoficiales/LIO/CONG/BOCG/A/BOCG-10-A-97-1.pdf
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tion 3.2 of the so-called Olivencia Report, 69 in Section IV.4 of the Aldama Report,70 and
in Recommendation 16 of the "Unified Code of Good Corporate Governance."71
These reports highlight the difficulty in deciding whether it is better to separate or
accumulate the positions of chairman of the board of directors and chief executive officer
of a listed company. All of these reports state that there are advantages and disadvantages
to each system. The reports suggest that there should not be a prohibition per se of the
accumulation of positions in the same person, but when this situation occurs, a lead inde-
pendent director should be appointed.
The Bill seems to have adopted this suggestion in creating a new article 529 of the
Spanish Companies Act related to the separation of positions.72 This article has two im-
plications: on the one hand, it establishes that the post of chairman of the board of direc-
tors and chief executive officer can be held by the same person, unless otherwise provided
in the bylaws of the company. On the other hand, the article requires an enhanced major-
ity to appoint the chairman of the board. As a second safeguard, if the positions of chair-
man of the board of directors and chief executive officer are combined in one person, the
article requires a new figure: the lead independent director. These measures-especially
the second one-are intended to avoid negative consequences that may arise from the ac-
cumulation of power within one person, particularly when such person carries out activi-
ties that are subject to the control and approval of the governing body chaired and run by
that same person.
If the Bill is finally passed, a time will come for the general shareholders and governing
bodies of listed companies to decide whether they intend to continue with the accumula-
tion of positions or whether they are willing to separate the positions in order to avoid the
appointment of a lead independent director.
X. Ukraine
The ongoing political and economic crisis in Ukraine has significantly affected the com-
mercial expectations of investors. Likewise, the structure, value, and size of M&A transac-
tions have changed. The main reasons for the low M&A activity in 2014 are the lack of
funds available for investments, the concentration of assets controlled by Ukrainian busi-
ness groups in key sectors, and the lack of transparency in acquisition and ownership
structures. These factors serve to deter foreign investors from considering projects and
potential M&A transactions involving a Ukrainian target.
The areas that showed activity in 2014 are agriculture, food, and beverage, infrastruc-
ture and energy (oil and gas, electricity and renewables), pharmaceuticals, and IT. Agri-
culture tops the list due to its significant potential and relatively low level of asset
69. Comisidn Especial para el Estudio de un Cddigo Etico de los Consdos de Administracidn de las Sociedades, El
Gobierno de las Sociedades Cotizadas-C6digo de Buen Gobierno (February 26, 1998) (Spain) available at
https://www.cnmv.es/DocPortal/Publicaciones/CodigoGov/govsocot.pdf
70. Informe de la Comisidn Especial para el Fomento de la Transarencia y Seguridad en los Mercados y en las
Sociedades, Informe Aldama, (January 8, 2003) (Spain), available at https://www.cnmv.es/DocPortal/Publica-
ciones/CodigoGov/INFORMEFINAL.pdf.
71. Comisi6n Nacional del Mercado de Valores 2013, Cddigo Unificado de Buen Gobierno Corporativo available
at https://www.cnmv.es/DocPortal/Publicaciones/CodigoGov/CUBGrefundidoJUNIO2013.pdf.
72. Spanish Companies Act Amendment Bill B.O.E. 2014, No. 121/000097, available at http://www.con-
greso.es/publicoficiales/LIO/CONG/BOCG/A/BOCG-10-A-97-1.pdf.
VOL. 49
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
AN ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
M&A AND JOINT VENTURES 75
consolidation. It is worth noting that there has not been much progress in financing
Ukrainian businesses through IPOs in the international capital markets, although the mar-
ket has seen some activity. Experts predict that IPOs are planned by several Ukrainian
companies in different sectors, mainly food and agriculture. But, given the latest
macroeconomic slowdown, IPOs most likely will be postponed to 2015 or 2016.
A. NON-FLEXIBLE CORPORATE LEGISLATION
The Ukrainian legislative environment has not seen any significant changes in 2014.
Ukrainian corporate legislation still does not recognize mechanisms such as derivative
actions, squeeze-out rights, call and put options, and drag-along and tag-along rights.
There is no specific act regulating public or private takeovers and mergers in Ukraine.
The concept of public bids is also underdeveloped in the Ukrainian legal framework. For
example, no distinction is made between hostile bids and bids that are supported by the
board of the target company.
Furthermore, limited liability companies ("LLCs") are still regulated by the outdated
Law on Business Companies.7 3 Since 2013, the adoption of the Law on LLCs and Addi-
tional Liability Companies has been actively discussed and would be one of the most
awaited changes in corporate legislation. There are two alternative proposals: No. 201174
and No.2011-1. 75 The main innovations of the proposals are the possibility to attend the
general meeting with the use of electronic communication means, the possibility to estab-
lish a supervisory board in an LLC, and the approval rights of the shareholders in relation
to the company entering into transactions that are significant or not at arm's length. The
next step in the legislative process is the acceptance of one of these proposals by
Verkhovna Rada for consideration and adoption.
B. RECENT CHANGES
The key problem that foreign investors have faced in 2014 is the restriction on repatria-
tion of investments in Ukrainian companies. Until December 2, 2014, the following for-
eign currency transactions relating to investments in Ukrainian companies are prohibited:
* repatriation of ftnds received by foreign investors as a result of sale of equity interests
in Ukrainian companies not represented by securities (such as equity in LLCs); and
* repatriation of dividends by foreign investors, except for dividends received from se-
curities listed at one of the local stock exchanges.7 6
In practice, this means that, at least until December 2, 2014, a foreign investor will not
be able to repatriate its investments. Although these restrictions should not affect the
transfer of title to shares and other equity interests as such, any proceeds from such trans-
actions will have to remain in Ukrainian bank accounts.
73. 3axo n"576-XII1)KoBrenb 1991, available at http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1576-12.
74. Draft Law on LLCs and Additional Liability Companies No. 2011 (2013) (Ukr.) (draft revoked Nov.
11, 2014), available at http://wl.cl.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=45462.
75. Id.
76. Resolution of the National Bank of Ukraine No. 591, September 22, 2014, available at http://
zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v0591500-1.
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C. INFORMATION ON BENEFICIAL OWNERS
All Ukrainian companies will be required to disclose information on their ultimate ben-
eficiaries to the State Registrar by May 25, 2014. Failure to comply with the disclosure
obligations may result in the director of the company being fined for 5,100 to 8,500
Ukrainian Hryvnyas (approximately USD 400 to 650).77
XI. United States
In 2014, Delaware courts continued to delineate directors' fiduciary duties in various
M&A contexts.
Upholding last year's Court of Chancery decision in In re MFW Shareholders Litigation78
(discussed in the 2013 Year in Review), 79 the Delaware Supreme Court, in Kahn v. M&F
Worldwide Corp.80 held that the deferential "business judgment" standard of review applies
in cases of "go-private" mergers involving a controlling stockholder, if (i) the controlling
stockholder conditions the deal at the outset on the approval of both a special committee
of the target corporation's board of directors and the "majority of the minority" of the
target's stockholders; (ii) the special committee is independent; (iii) the special committee
is empowered to freely select its own advisors and to veto the transaction; (iv) the special
committee acts with care in negotiating a fair price; (v) the minority stockholders' vote is
informed; and (vi) the minority stockholders are not coerced .81 The Supreme Court
noted, however, that full trials may be necessary to determine whether special committees
have met their obligations to negotiate effectively with controlling stockholders.
In Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht,8 2 the Court of Chancery denied plaintiffs' motion to
enjoin Sotheby's 2014 annual meeting. The plaintiff stockholders, led by the activist fund
Third Point, alleged that the Sotheby's board breached its fiduciary duties by adopting a
two-tiered stockholder rights plan (allowing passive investors to acquire up to a twenty
percent interest, while restricting activist investors to a ten percent stake), and refusing to
permit Third Point to acquire up to a twenty percent stake in Sotheby's." In denying the
preliminary injunction, the Court held that (i) Unocal's "enhanced scrutiny" provided the
appropriate standard of review with respect to the adoption of the rights plan and the
refusal to waive the rights plan trigger for Third Point, and (ii) the actions taken by the
Sotheby's board were reasonable and proportionate in response to a legally cognizable
threat posed by Third Point and other activist investors.8 4 Because of the procedural
posture and fact-specific nature of the Court's analysis, practitioners must be cautious in
drawing broad conclusions from this decision.
77. 3aKOH n" 1701-I 14 )OBTeHb 2014, available at http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1701-vii.
78. In re MFW Shareholders Litig., 67 A.3d 496 (Del. Ch. 2013).
79. Maria Cibele Crepaldi Affonso dos Santos et al., International M&A and ]oint Ventures, 48 YEAR RE-
VIEw. 65, 85 (2013).
80. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., No. 334, 2013, slip op., 2014 WL 99270 (Del. Mar. 14, 2014).
81. Id.




PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
AN ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
M&A AND JOINT VENTURES 77
The Delaware Court of Chancery's opinions in In re Rural/Metro Corporation Stockhold-
ers Litigation85 provided practitioners with a stern reminder of the importance of running
an orderly, conflict-free sale process. In evaluating the process of Rural/Metro Corpora-
tion's 2011 sale to a Warburg Pincus LLC affiliate, the Court found various deficiencies
and conflicts of interest, including: (i) an uninvolved Rural/Metro board of directors; (ii) a
sale process managed by a conflicted special committee of Rural/Metro's board; (iii) the
special committee's engagement of a lead financial advisor, RBC, that (unknown to Rural/
Metro) prioritized a speedy sale in hopes of providing "stapled" financing to potential
buyers above maximizing stockholder value; (iv) the absence of valuation analyses through
the sale process, followed by RBC's "last-minute" provision of manipulated analyses de-
signed to induce Rural/Metro's acceptance of Warburg's offer; and (v) a sale process that,
at RBC's suggestion, coincided with the sale process of EMS, Rural/Metro's largest com-
petitor, effectively disqualifying any potential bidders that were occupied pursuing EMS. 86
Plaintiffs' claims against Rural/Metro's directors were settled, but plaintiffs' actions
against RBC proceeded to trial. Despite the generous premium paid by Warburg in the
acquisition (and Rural/Metro's subsequent bankruptcy), the Court held that RBC aided
and abetted the Rural/Metro board's breach of its fiduciary duties. In a later opinion that
has ignited much debate, the Court determined that RBC was liable for $75.8 million of
the $91.3 million in damages suffered by Rural/Metro's stockholders.8 7
85. In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014); in re Rural Metro Corp.
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